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    zero trust tool gate

    1

    Enforce pre-execution justification and human-in-the-loop approval gates for high-blast-radius agent tools.

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    zero trust tool gate

    zero trust tool gate

    Example session with this skill installed

    Set up a safety gate for an agent that has write access to our production Postgres database and can delete S3 buckets. We need to make sure it doesn't do anything irreversible without a human.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the zero trust tool

    I have configured the Zero-Trust Tool Gate for your production agent. This implementation enforces a justification-first sequence and separates the agent's reasoning from the approval authority.

    Database and Infra Safety Gate Configuration

    Tool CategoryAction TypeBlast RadiusApproval Threshold
    SQL WriteUPDATE, INSERTSingle-RecordAuto-log & Proceed
    SQL DeleteDELETE, TRUNCATEBulk/IrreversibleHuman Approval Required
    S3 Storageput_objectReversibleAuto-log & Proceed
    S3 Storagedelete_bucketIrreversibleHuman Approval Required
    Any ToolCumulative > 50 rowsBulkHuman Approval Required

    Implementation Instructions

    The following procedural logic has been prepared for your agent's system context:

    1. Identify if the target tool is in the high-stakes inventory.
    2. Generate a justification string explaining the business necessity.
    3. Perform a dry-run or EXPLAIN to count affected rows (do not trust internal estimates).
    4. Classify the action sensitivity. If unknown, escalate to regulated.
    5. Call the approval_service API. This is a blocking call to an external endpoint.
    6. Log the request_id, justification, and approval_token to the append-only audit_db.
    7. Execute the tool only if approval_token is valid.

    Next steps

    • Wire the approval_service to your team's Slack #prod-alerts channel.
    • Configure the audit_db with INSERT-only permissions for the agent's service account.
    • Run the provided adversarial test suite to attempt a bypass using SQL synonyms.

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    Stop agents from executing destructive actions before they happen. This skill provides a behavioral discipline framework that forces agents to justify, classify, and log high-stakes tool calls prior to execution. It addresses the critical vulnerability where agents explain their mistakes after damage is done or fabricate plausible justifications for unsafe operations.

    What it does

    • Pre-execution justification ensures the agent writes a plain-text reason for a tool call before it runs.
    • Blast-radius classification categorizes actions by reversibility and scope rather than simple phrase-matching.
    • Cumulative tracking monitors multiple small actions that add up to a high-severity event within a single session.
    • Sensitivity thresholding maps resources to approval tiers, triggering human-in-the-loop requirements for regulated data.
    • Structured audit logging produces queryable, append-only records of justifications and approval statuses.

    How it works

    1. Tool Inventorying identifies every tool in the agent's stack and classifies them as read-only, reversible, or destructive.
    2. Policy Configuration defines the forbidden-actions floor, resource sensitivity tiers, and cumulative blast-radius limits.
    3. Procedural Injection adds the multi-step gate sequence (justify, check, classify, log, execute) into the agent context.
    4. Adversarial Testing verifies the gate by attempting to bypass it via prompt injection or phrased synonyms.

    Frameworks & tools

    Works with any agentic framework including LangChain, OpenAI Agents SDK, CrewAI, and AutoGPT. Integrates with external approval channels like Slack, Jira, or custom APIs.

    Why this beats prompting it yourself

    Most manual prompts result in post-hoc explanations that fail to stop destructive actions. This skill enforces a specific sequence that fails closed and accounts for session-wide cumulative risks that simple system prompts miss.

    Use cases

    • Gating DROP TABLE or bulk DELETE operations on production databases.
    • Requiring human approval before an agent sends external communications to customers.
    • Managing infrastructure changes in AWS, GCP, or Azure environments.
    • Preventing unauthorized credential rotations or security configuration changes.

    Known limitations

    Does not replace technical sandboxing or scoped credentials. The reasoning step can be bypassed by sophisticated prompt injection if not paired with input sanitization.

    Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for Agents & Orchestration.

    Not a substitute for technical permissions or sandboxing. Reasoning can be influenced by prompt injection from external content. Requires external API for durable, non-self-approved logs.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

      Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.

    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before buying a skill.

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    Listed1 month ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    It adds a procedural discipline to the agent's own instructions: before any tool you've classified as high-stakes, the agent writes a justification, classifies the action by blast radius, records its approval status to a log, and only then proceeds. Because the sequence is the mechanism, a log entry written after the tool ran is ruled out by design. This is guidance the model follows, not a technical barrier. It can be talked past by a confident-sounding justification or by attacker-controlled content, so use it together with permissions, scoped credentials and sandboxing.

    It is framework-independent because it is written as instructions for the agent itself, not as code. You add it to the agent's system prompt or skill stack and define which of your tools count as high-stakes. It does not wrap or intercept tool calls, so it cannot enforce anything on its own.

    The discipline tells the agent to classify cumulatively, tracking the running total of blast radius across a session or time window and applying your threshold to that total rather than to each call alone. The agent follows this rule; nothing external counts calls for it. For hard enforcement, pair it with a limit in the system that executes the tools.

    The skill instructions and one dated reference file covering existing permission and human-approval patterns and the incident the skill's threat model is based on. There are no code modules or policy templates. You define your own sensitivity tiers and decide where approvals are sent; the skill explains how to wire the approval step so the agent cannot approve itself.

    Setup means adding the discipline to your agent, listing which tools are high-stakes, defining your sensitivity tiers, and wiring an approval channel the agent's own credentials can't write to. The time depends mostly on that last step and on your tooling. I would not give a figure.

    No, this skill is designed to prevent logic-based errors and unauthorized actions; we strongly recommend maintaining standard technical sandboxing and IAM least-privilege principles as a secondary layer.

    New in Agents & Orchestration