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WordPress Plugin Safety Check
A register_rest_route() with DELETE and no permission_callback is open to the whole internet, and "WHERE id = " .
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WordPress Plugin Safety Check
Example session with this skill installed
Check this project with wordpress-plugin-safety-check.
- Read your context and instructions
- Compiled the wordpress plugin safety
$ python3 scripts/check_wp_plugin.py examples/risky
BLOCK order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:26 W01 SQL_WITH_REQUEST_DATA
$rows = $wpdb->get_results( "SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}order_desk WHERE status = '$status'" );
Why: A $wpdb query (query, get_results, get_row, get_var, get_col, or the query string given to prepare) is built with request data ($_GET, $_POST, $_REQUEST, $_COOKIE, request headers) that was not turned into a number or passed as a prepare() placeholder. sanitize_text_field() and wp_unslash() do not make a value safe for SQL, so anyone who can send the request can read or change the database (SQL injection).
Safer: Pass every value as a $wpdb->prepare() placeholder: $wpdb->get_row( $wpdb->prepare( "SELECT * FROM {$wpdb->prefix}orders WHERE id = %d", $id ) ). Cast IDs with absint() and check ORDER BY columns and table names against an allow list (or use %i on WordPress 6.2 and later).
BLOCK order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:28 W04 REQUEST_DATA_ECHOED
BLOCK order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:30 W05 REQUEST_DATA_IN_DANGEROUS_CALL
BLOCK order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:37 W06 OPTION_OR_META_NAME_FROM_REQUEST
BLOCK order-desk/order-desk.php:16 W03 STATE_CHANGE_WITHOUT_NONCE
BLOCK order-desk/order-desk.php:27 W02 REST_WRITE_ROUTE_WITHOUT_PERMISSION_CALLBACK
REVIEW order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:27 W15 SQL_NOT_PREPARED
REVIEW order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:29 W14 OUTPUT_NOT_ESCAPED
REVIEW order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:37 W13 SETTING_SAVED_UNSANITIZED
REVIEW order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:42 W11 MISSING_CAPABILITY_CHECK
REVIEW order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:45 W16 FILE_PATH_OR_UPLOAD_FROM_REQUEST
REVIEW order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:56 W16 FILE_PATH_OR_UPLOAD_FROM_REQUEST
REVIEW order-desk/includes/class-order-desk-ajax.php:63 W15 SQL_NOT_PREPARED
REVIEW order-desk/order-desk.php:14 W18 NO_DIRECT_ACCESS_GUARD
REVIEW order-desk/order-desk.php:21 W13 SETTING_SAVED_UNSANITIZED
REVIEW order-desk/order-desk.php:31 W12 REST_ROUTE_OPEN_TO_EVERYONE
REVIEW order-desk/order-desk.php:40 W17 TLS_VERIFY_OFF
REVIEW order-desk/readme.txt:5 W19 README_HEADER_PROBLEM
REVIEW order-desk/readme.txt:7 W19 README_HEADER_PROBLEM
(Each finding also has Why and Safer lines, as in the first one.)
Verdict: BLOCK. Checked 3 files, 3 with WordPress plugin or theme content.
This is a static check of file text. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.
About this skill
One wp_ajax_ handler that saves settings without check_ajax_referer() lets another site make a logged-in admin change them, and any subscriber can call it when current_user_can() is missing. A register_rest_route() with DELETE and no permission_callback is open to the whole internet, and "WHERE id = " . $_GET['id'] in a $wpdb query is SQL injection even after sanitize_text_field(). These are the mistakes behind most plugin security advisories. This skill finds them and the other WordPress plugin mistakes below before you release or submit to WordPress.org, and tells you how to fix each one.
Your agent runs a scanner on the plugin or theme folder: every .php file and the plugin readme.txt. It follows request data ($_GET, $_POST, $_REQUEST, $_COOKIE, $_FILES, request headers, filter_input(), REST request parameters) through assignments, foreach loops, ternaries, wp_unslash() and string building inside each function, and knows which WordPress functions sanitize (sanitize_text_field, absint, sanitize_key), escape (esc_html, esc_attr, esc_url, wp_kses_post) or prepare ($wpdb->prepare placeholders) a value. It matches add_action() hooks, admin pages and REST routes to their handlers by name across all files, including the plugin boilerplate's hook loader and nonce or permission helpers the handler calls. The examples from the plugin handbook (AJAX with check_ajax_referer, the settings page, REST endpoints with __return_true on GET routes, the REST controller) are not reported as BLOCK. It never runs PHP or WordPress. It returns BLOCK, REVIEW, or NOT FLAGGED, with the file, line, reason, and a safer approach. Secrets in shown lines are never printed.
What it checks
BLOCK
- W01: $wpdb queries (query, get_results, get_row, get_var, get_col, or the query string given to prepare) built with request data that was not cast to a number or passed as a placeholder
- W02: REST routes with POST, PUT, PATCH or DELETE methods and no permission_callback (when the callback checks current_user_can() itself, it is W12)
- W03: wp_ajax_, admin_post_, admin page and admin_init handlers that change data because of the request without a nonce check, including wp_verify_nonce() results that are ignored and checks that only run when that nonce field is present (handlers also registered for wp_ajax_nopriv_ are public by design and left to W11)
- W04: request data printed with echo, print, short echo tags, printf, _e or wp_die without escaping, including $_SERVER['PHP_SELF'], REQUEST_URI and request headers
- W05: request data in unserialize(), maybe_unserialize(), extract(), include or require, eval(), call_user_func(), a variable function name, or a shell command
- W06: option names and user meta keys taken from the request (update_option, delete_option, update_user_meta and similar), or a whole $_POST array given to wp_update_user()
REVIEW
- W11: handlers that change data without current_user_can() (wp_ajax_ and admin_post_ for any logged-in user; wp_ajax_nopriv_, admin_init and init for settings, users, plugins and files), including is_admin() used as a permission check
- W12: GET routes without permission_callback, write routes whose permission_callback is __return_true, always returns true, or is is_user_logged_in, and write routes without one whose callback checks current_user_can() itself
- W13: request data saved with update_option, update_post_meta, update_user_meta or set_theme_mod without a sanitizing function, and register_setting() without a sanitize_callback
- W14: unescaped output of get_option, get_post_meta, get_user_meta, get_theme_mod, get_transient, add_query_arg(), remove_query_arg(), get_query_var(), REST parameters, and request data that was only sanitized
- W15: $wpdb queries joined together from REST parameters or from esc_sql()/esc_like() escaped request data instead of prepare()
- W16: file calls (unlink, readfile, file_get_contents, fopen, file_put_contents, copy, rename, $wp_filesystem) with paths from the request, move_uploaded_file() with no file type check, and wp_handle_upload() with 'test_type' => false
- W17: TLS checks turned off: 'sslverify' => false, CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYPEER or CURLOPT_SSL_VERIFYHOST off, 'verify_peer' => false, the https_ssl_verify filter returning false (loopback requests to the site itself are not reported)
- W18: plugin PHP files that run code before any ABSPATH check, and uninstall.php without a WP_UNINSTALL_PLUGIN check (guards such as if ( ! defined( 'ABSPATH' ) ) { header( ... ); exit; } and Akismet's ! function_exists( 'add_action' ) check count)
- W19: readme.txt header problems: no === Plugin Name === line, missing Contributors, Tested up to, Stable tag or License, Stable tag: trunk, a Stable tag that differs from Version in the main plugin file, Tested up to older than the last three major WordPress releases, more than 5 tags, a short description over 150 characters, the template's default text
What's included
- The scanner (Python 3.9+, standard library only)
- A rules guide with the reason, safer approach and official WordPress or PHP source for each rule
- A risky and a safe example plugin (main file, AJAX and REST handlers, readme.txt), and the real report the scanner produces on the risky one
Limits It reads each file as written. Request data is followed inside one function; values passed between functions, stored in class properties by another method, or passed through filters are not followed, and output of functions it does not know counts as safe. Hooks with names or callbacks built at run time, and nonce or capability checks more than one call away from the handler, are not seen. JavaScript, block.json, vendor and tests folders are not read. Files that only define classes or functions are not asked for an ABSPATH guard (Plugin Check is stricter there), and theme files are not checked for it. Tested up to is compared with a dated cut-off: 6.9, the oldest of the last three major releases in November 2026. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for Security.
Static check of PHP and readme.txt text. Data passed between functions or through filters, hooks built at run time, checks more than one call deep, JavaScript and block.json are not followed or read. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
How to use
- 1
Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP
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- 2
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- 3
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Trust & safety
Security scan
Security scan passed 4 days ago
Permissions
Runs one local Python script in the terminal. It reads your project's files, writes nothing, and makes no network calls. The example plugin contains deliberately unsafe PHP for the scanner to find; it is never run and holds no real keys or tokens.