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    What Your Repo Hides

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    This pack does not review your code.

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    What Your Repo Hides

    What Your Repo Hides

    Example session with this skill installed

    Audit my live Supabase project for row level security leaks and fix them with versioned migrations.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the what your repo

    Step 0 (read-only) found 3 issues in your live project:

    1. profiles has a column email and a policy SELECT ... USING (true) — every authenticated user can read every profile's email.
    2. agent_tasks has a policy FOR ALL USING (true) WITH CHECK (true). It is unreachable today only because no GRANT exposes it — one GRANT and the whole table is open.
    3. public.sync_profile_email() is SECURITY DEFINER without a pinned search_path, and the project's default privileges give the anonymous role arwdDxtm on every new table.

    The two-role suite confirms it: user B currently sees 4 rows that belong to user A.
    Here are the four migrations that close it, in order, with the rollback script.

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    Your repo says your RLS is fine. Your live project says otherwise.

    This pack does not review your code. It inspects your live project and shows you what is actually open — even when the repo claims it is closed.

    The three ways a migration file lies

    1. REVOKE … FROM anon does not close a function. Postgres grants EXECUTE to PUBLIC on every new function by default, and anon is a member of PUBLIC. Revoking from anon leaves the PUBLIC grant standing, so the function keeps answering. The fix is REVOKE … FROM PUBLIC, anon. (PostgreSQL docs: "by default, execute privilege is granted to PUBLIC for newly created functions… you must revoke the default PUBLIC privileges".)
    2. Default privileges set by hand in the dashboard live in no migration. Your history looks clean while every table created tomorrow is born with the anonymous role holding arwdDxtm — insert, select, update, delete, truncate, references, trigger. And TRUNCATE, REFERENCES and TRIGGER do not pass through RLS at all.
    3. The owner bypasses RLS. The dashboard's table editor runs as the owner, so it shows you every row of a correctly locked table — and a policy with using (true) passes that test too. force row level security binds the owner; a superuser or a role with BYPASSRLS still walks past it, which is why the only honest check is switching role.

    Only a photo of the live state settles it. That is step zero, and it is read-only.

    What you get

    • A read-only inventory (11 queries) returning the real state: tables without RLS, policies with using (true), effective grants for the anonymous / authenticated / public roles, views without security_invoker, SECURITY DEFINER functions without a pinned search_path, and where your identity column lives today. Saved as your baseline for rollback.
    • Four locks, closed in order. Identity anchored to auth.users.id (never email, never user_metadata); enable + force RLS with no using (true) and a with check on update; the second lock (grants, sequences, EXECUTE revoked from the public role, alter default privileges so future tables arrive closed); and views with security_invoker = true.
    • A two-role test suite that fails when it should. One transaction, ROLLBACK, two simulated identities (set local role authenticated + set_config('request.jwt.claims', …)) and the negative assertions that actually matter: B cannot see A's rows (not even by direct id), cannot insert with A's owner_id, cannot update or delete A's rows, cannot reassign owner_id on its own row, and cannot touch somebody else's folder. An end-to-end variant runs the same checks through the public API with each test user's token.
    • A diagnosis table of 15 symptoms → cause → action, in the order to check them, so you stop chasing the wrong error.
    • A demo bench (schema + two seeded users) to watch the failure and the fix before touching the real project.
    • A minimum-surface alternative: revoke everything, put the authorization in one edge function with service_role, and keep the rules in code you can unit-test.

    What this does not do

    • It does not explain RLS. It closes it.
    • It does not cover Realtime, RLS on storage.objects, or server-level pg_hba/roles.
    • The SQL was reviewed against the PostgreSQL grammar on 2026-11-10 and has not been run against a live instance by the author. Step 0 and the test suite are read-only: run them first and keep the baseline output as your rollback reference.
    • Applying REVOKE/GRANT changes what the public API may do. If something depended on a permission you removed, it breaks immediately and visibly — not silently. Apply in staging with the suite green, and have the rollback written before you start.

    Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for Security.

    Does not cover Realtime, RLS on storage.objects, or server-level pg_hba/roles policy. Does not cover logical replication or row-level security on foreign tables. The SQL was reviewed against the PostgreSQL grammar on 2026-11-10 and has not been executed against a live instance by the author — the read-only inventory and the test suite are the intended first steps. Applying REVOKE/GRANT changes what the public API may do; test in staging with the suite green, and keep the rollback script written before you start.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

      Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.

    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before buying a skill.

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    Software
    Postgres 15+ (Supabase qualifies)Two test users in auth.users
    Optional
    Python 3.8+ (only for the end-to-end REST suite)

    Nothing to install for the SQL path — run the files in your SQL Editor. The REST variant needs Python 3.8+ and reads your project URL and anon key from the environment. SQL Editor access with a DDL-capable role.

    Permissions

    File Scopes

    the
    files
    you
    copy
    from
    this
    pack
    into
    your
    own
    repository

    The SQL runs in your own database through your own SQL Editor or client; the pack never connects to anything on its own and makes no network calls. The optional Python script reads two environment variables you set (your project URL and your anon key) and talks to your own Supabase public API, read-only, to run the negative checks as two real users.

    Listed6 days ago
    Updated1 day ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    No. It does not explain RLS; it closes it. You get the migrations and the test that proves the closure.

    No. The pack touches your database, not your application. Identity policies reference auth.uid(), which your app already has.

    Then step 0 says so in about five minutes and you keep the baseline as your rollback reference. That is still worth having.

    Yes, the SQL is Postgres. The auth.uid() helpers are Supabase's; on plain Postgres you replace them with your own session variable.

    It is 11 select statements against pg_catalog and your schema. It changes nothing.

    That is the product working. The failure names the exact assertion and the rows involved, and points at the migration that fixes it.

    No. The SQL Editor is enough. The Python variant is optional and only for running the same checks end-to-end over the public API.

    It finds it and gives you the versioned migration that closes it. The finding is yours either way; the fix is the four files.

    New in Security