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Threat Hunting and Detection Engineering
Hypothesis-led threat hunting: baseline normal in SIEM/EDR data, stack queries into a funnel, convert confirmed hunts into detection rules with a false-positive budget, and validate in the lab.
$5
Threat Hunting and Detection Engineering
Example session with this skill installed
Over the last month our EDR flagged a few workstations running rundll32 with no command line at odd hours. We have 90 days of endpoint process logs and authentication logs in our SIEM, and a small SOC team. Can you run this as a hunt and show us what you would actually do, step by step?
- Read your context and instructions
- Compiled the threat hunting
HUNT — rundll32 with empty command lines, off-hours.
Hypothesis (scored 7/8): an intruder is proxying execution through rundll32 to blend with OS noise. Data: process-creation logs record full command lines and parents; auth logs cover the same 90 days. Success = one chain linking an empty-command-line rundll32 to a suspicious parent or an unusual logon on the same host. Negative = every instance traces to a signed OS or vendor parent inside its normal pattern.
Baseline: rundll32 fires ~1,900 times/day fleet-wide. Legitimate parents are dominated by the OS shell, the print spooler, and two vendor updaters; empty command lines are normal for one updater's maintenance task, which runs 01:00–03:00 under a service account. That carve-out is the noise floor — exclude it by parent hash and account, not by time alone.
Funnel: broad pull of empty-command-line rundll32 over 90 days: 412 events. Filter out the known updater and shell parents: 37 remain. Correlate against parents outside the baseline and logons within 30 minutes: 4 events on 2 hosts share one parent — a user-writable sync tool — and one host shows a network logon from an account that never touches it. Timeline on that host: sync tool starts, rundll32 (empty) follows, outbound connection 6 minutes later. That narrative fits execution-then-beacon; the other 3 events resolve to a misconfigured printer driver.
Verdict: escalate the one host as a package (timeline, IOCs, scope note). Convert: a Sigma-style rule — rundll32 with empty or unusual command line AND parent outside the approved set — backfilled over the 90 days at ~3 hits/day, inside budget with the updater allow-listed. Atomic lab test scheduled before the rule is enabled, and the negative coverage for the rest of the fleet is written into the hunt log.
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About this skill
Alert queues only show you what your detectors already know. This skill runs threat hunting as a discipline: every hunt starts as a falsifiable hypothesis about adversary behavior — scored on a rubric before query time is spent — and normal gets baselined before anyone anomaly-hunts, so the noise floor stops eating the schedule. Queries run as a stacked funnel (broad, filter, correlate, timeline) that shrinks candidates by roughly an order of magnitude per stage. Confirmed techniques convert into detection rules written as portable code with explicit field mappings, each carrying a false-positive budget estimated from your own data and a decision table for when a rule should alert, aggregate, or stay a hunt query. Nothing guards production unproven: new rules pass atomic lab tests and historical backfill first, tuned from the backfill evidence. Negatives are logged as coverage, positives escalate as timeline and IOC packages rather than chat messages, and every hunt feeds a prioritized backlog of follow-up hypotheses.
Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for Security.
- It cannot manufacture telemetry: if your logging doesn't capture a behavior, the honest output is a data gap and a reformulated hypothesis, not a verdict.
- Validation assumes you have (or can build) an isolated lab to run adversary techniques safely; without one, rules ship with an explicit unvalidated flag.
- It hands confirmed intrusions to incident response with an evidence package — containment and eradication are IR's process, not this skill's.
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