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Tauri Security Check
Check Tauri 1 and 2 apps before release: allowlist all, shells the webview can run, file scopes over the home folder, a missing CSP, remote sites calling commands, leaked signing keys and unsafe updater settings.
$5
Tauri Security Check
Example session with this skill installed
Check this project with tauri-security-check.
- Read your context and instructions
- Compiled the tauri security check
$ python3 scripts/check_tauri.py examples/risky
BLOCK legacy-v1/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:16 T01 ALLOWLIST_ALL
"all": true,
Why: Tauri 1 tauri > allowlist > all: true turns on every API the app's JavaScript can call: shell, file system, HTTP, process, clipboard, new windows and more. Any script that runs in the webview (an XSS, a compromised frontend package, injected HTML) gets all of them, limited only by the scopes.
Safer: Set all to false and turn on only the functions the frontend uses (for example dialog.open and fs.readFile), each with the narrowest scope. On Tauri 2, grant plugin permissions per window in src-tauri/capabilities.
BLOCK legacy-v1/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:33 T05 REMOTE_SITE_IPC
BLOCK src-tauri/capabilities/default.json:10 T03 BROAD_FILE_ACCESS
BLOCK src-tauri/capabilities/default.json:15 T02 WEBVIEW_CAN_RUN_PROGRAMS
BLOCK src-tauri/capabilities/web-sync.json:7 T05 REMOTE_SITE_IPC
BLOCK src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:23 T04 CSP_MISSING_WITH_EXPOSED_API
BLOCK src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:27 T03 BROAD_FILE_ACCESS
BLOCK src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:42 T06 SECRET_IN_CONFIG
BLOCK src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:47 T02 WEBVIEW_CAN_RUN_PROGRAMS
REVIEW companion/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:21 T18 CSP_MISSING
REVIEW legacy-v1/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:18 T15 BROAD_PERMISSION
REVIEW legacy-v1/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:30 T11 WEAK_CSP
REVIEW legacy-v1/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:42 T14 UPDATER_NOT_SECURED
REVIEW legacy-v1/src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:43 T14 UPDATER_NOT_SECURED
REVIEW src-tauri/capabilities/account.json:7 T17 REMOTE_SITE_IPC_LIMITED
REVIEW src-tauri/capabilities/default.json:11 T15 BROAD_PERMISSION
REVIEW src-tauri/capabilities/default.json:16 T15 BROAD_PERMISSION
REVIEW src-tauri/capabilities/default.json:21 T16 BROAD_HTTP_SCOPE
REVIEW src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:13 T13 GLOBAL_TAURI_API
REVIEW src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:24 T12 ASSET_CSP_CHANGES_OFF
REVIEW src-tauri/tauri.conf.json:50 T14 UPDATER_NOT_SECURED
(Each finding also has Why and Safer lines, as in the first one.)
Verdict: BLOCK. Checked 7 files, 7 with Tauri content.
This is a static check of file text. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.
About this skill
One capability entry such as { "cmd": "powershell", "args": true }, fs:allow-home-write or an asset scope of "$HOME/**" lets any script that gets into your webview run programs, read every file the user owns or plant code in ~/.bashrc. And "csp": null, the create-tauri-app default, is fine for a first build but should be tightened before release, before the app grants that kind of access. This skill finds these and the other Tauri settings that matter before you ship, and tells you how to fix each one.
Your agent runs a scanner on tauri.conf.json, tauri.conf.json5 and Tauri.toml (with their platform and --config files) and on the capability files in src-tauri/capabilities (JSON, JSON5 or TOML). It reads both Tauri 1 (allowlist, tauri > security, tauri > updater) and Tauri 2 (app > security, plugins, capabilities and plugin permissions such as shell:allow-execute, fs:scope and http:default), tells them apart, and knows that a platform file only overrides what it sets. It reads each app's capabilities before judging its CSP, so the stock template gets a REVIEW, not a BLOCK. It allows comments and trailing commas, points at the exact line, and leaves app folders, fixed commands, sidecars and subdomain scopes alone. It never builds or runs your app. It returns BLOCK, REVIEW, or NOT FLAGGED, with the file, line, reason, and a safer approach. Secrets are never printed.
What it checks
BLOCK
- T01: Tauri 1 allowlist all: true
- T02: shells and interpreters the webview can start with code it chooses (args: true, a validator after -c or -Command), a shell open regex that accepts file paths, opener paths on broad folders
- T03: file or asset scopes over the disk, the home folder, shared app data, credential folders or shell startup and autostart files (, $HOME/, $HOME/.ssh, $HOME/.bashrc), and any write access to the home folder (fs:allow-home-write)
- T04: no CSP in an app that also has withGlobalTauri, a remote window, remote IPC, or shell, fs or http access
- T05: remote sites that can call commands (dangerousRemoteDomainIpcAccess, remote urls for any host, over http, or with shell, fs or http permissions)
- T06: an updater private key, a signCommand password or other secrets in the config
REVIEW
- T11: a CSP that allows unsafe-eval, any source, whole schemes or remote script hosts
- T12: dangerousDisableAssetCspModification
- T13: withGlobalTauri: true
- T14: an updater without a usable public key, with http endpoints or dangerousInsecureTransportProtocol
- T15: programs allowed any arguments, whole user folders (Documents, Downloads, Desktop), and read access to the top of the home folder
- T16: HTTP scopes open to any host (https://**, https://*, *)
- T17: remote https sites with limited permissions
- T18: no CSP in an app without that access, such as the create-tauri-app default (tighten it before release)
What's included
- The scanner (Python 3.9+, standard library only)
- A rules guide with the reason and safer approach for each rule
- A risky and a safe example project (a Tauri 2 app with capabilities, a freshly scaffolded companion app and an older Tauri 1 app), and the real report the scanner produces on the risky one
Limits It reads config and capability files as written. Rust code (custom commands, scopes added in tauri::Builder), app-defined permission files, a CSP set only in index.html, frontend code and the installed Tauri and plugin versions are not checked. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for Security.
Static check of Tauri config and capability text. Rust code, app-defined permissions, a CSP written only in HTML, frontend code and installed versions are not checked. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
How to use
- 1
Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP
Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup
- 2
Sign in to Agensi
Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.
- 3
Ask for what you need
Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before buying a skill.
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Trust & safety
Security scan
Security scan passed 5 days ago
Requires
Mac only
Permissions
Allowed Hosts
Runs one local Python script in the terminal. It reads your project's files, writes nothing, and makes no network calls. The example configs contain a fake signing password (marked NOTREAL) and a made-up updater public key. Nothing is run.