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systemd Unit Check
Check systemd unit files before you install them: passwords in Environment=, programs run from /tmp, apps running as root with no sandboxing, missing hardening, CAP_SYS_ADMIN, and curl | bash run at every start.
$5
systemd Unit Check
Example session with this skill installed
Check this project with systemd-unit-check.
- Read your context and instructions
- Compiled the systemd unit check
$ python3 scripts/check_systemd.py examples/risky
BLOCK deploy/systemd/report-export.service:11 U01 SECRET_IN_UNIT
ExecStart=/var/tmp/report-export --upload-token=<redacted>
Why: A password, token or key is written in the unit: in Environment=, in SetCredential=, in a URL (postgres://user:password@...), or on a command line (--password=..., an Authorization header). Unit files are usually readable by every local user, systemd shows Environment= to unprivileged users over D-Bus (systemctl show), command lines show up in ps and systemctl status, and the systemd manual says SetCredential= is not for secret data.
Safer: Keep the secret in a root-only file and pass it with LoadCredential=name:/etc/app/secret (the program reads $CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY/name), or use SetCredentialEncrypted= or an EnvironmentFile= with mode 600. Change the secret that was written in the unit.
BLOCK deploy/systemd/report-export.service:11 U02 RUNS_FROM_WORLD_WRITABLE_DIR
BLOCK deploy/systemd/shop-api.service:11 U01 SECRET_IN_UNIT
BLOCK deploy/systemd/shop-api.service:12 U01 SECRET_IN_UNIT
BLOCK deploy/systemd/shop-api.service.d/override.conf:3 U01 SECRET_IN_UNIT
BLOCK deploy/systemd/shop-worker.service:10 U02 RUNS_FROM_WORLD_WRITABLE_DIR
BLOCK deploy/systemd/shop-worker.service:11 U01 SECRET_IN_UNIT
REVIEW deploy/systemd/report-export.service:9 U14 DOWNLOAD_RUN_AT_START
REVIEW deploy/systemd/shop-api.service:13 U14 DOWNLOAD_RUN_AT_START
REVIEW deploy/systemd/shop-api.service:14 U11 APP_RUNS_AS_ROOT_UNSANDBOXED
REVIEW deploy/systemd/shop-worker.service:6 U12 NO_HARDENING
REVIEW deploy/systemd/shop-worker.service:12 U13 BROAD_CAPABILITIES
(Each finding also has Why and Safer lines, as in the first one.)
Verdict: BLOCK. Checked 5 files, 5 with systemd unit content.
This is a static check of file text. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.
About this skill
Environment=DB_PASSWORD=... in a unit file can be read by any user on the server with systemctl show, and a Node or Python app started without a User= line runs as root. This skill finds those and four other systemd unit mistakes before you install the unit, and tells you how to fix each one.
Your agent runs a scanner on your .service, .socket and .timer files, the drop-in overrides in <unit>.d/*.conf (what systemctl edit writes) and templates such as myapp.service.j2. It reads units the way systemd does: comment lines, backslash continuations, ExecStart= prefixes such as - and +, sh -c scripts, and drop-ins applied in order so a later User= wins. It tells your own applications apart from the programs Linux distributions ship, so stock units such as ssh, nginx, cron and docker are not reported. It never runs systemctl or the unit's commands. It returns BLOCK, REVIEW, or NOT FLAGGED, with the file, line, reason, and a safer approach. Secrets are never printed.
What it checks
BLOCK
- U01: passwords, tokens and keys in Environment=, SetCredential=, URLs and command-line flags
- U02: programs, scripts or environment files in /tmp, /var/tmp or /dev/shm
REVIEW
- U11: applications running as root with no sandboxing (no User=, User=root, or a + prefix)
- U12: application services with none of NoNewPrivileges, ProtectSystem, ProtectHome and PrivateTmp
- U13: ambient capabilities close to root, such as CAP_SYS_ADMIN or CAP_DAC_OVERRIDE
- U14: curl | bash and downloaded programs run each time the service starts
What's included
- The scanner (Python 3.9+, standard library only)
- A rules guide with the reason and safer approach for each rule
- A risky and a safe example project, and the real report the scanner produces on the risky one
Limits It reads unit text, not the server: drop-ins and environment files outside the scanned folder, template logic, file ownership and what the program does after it starts are not checked. Agents that really need root (backup or monitoring tools in /opt or /usr/local) are reported for review. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for Security.
Static check of systemd unit text. Units and drop-ins outside the scanned folder, unit type drop-ins (service.d/), template logic, file ownership and the live state of services are not checked. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
How to use
- 1
Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP
Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup
- 2
Sign in to Agensi
Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.
- 3
Ask for what you need
Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before buying a skill.
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- Software
Python
Permissions
Runs one local Python script in the terminal. It reads your project's files, writes nothing, and makes no network calls. The example project includes clearly fake, inert passwords and tokens (NOTREAL, not-a-real-..., EXAMPLE) for the scanner to find. It is never installed.