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    Supply Chain Security Assessment

    1

    Assess your own supply chain end to end: SBOM as inventory, reachability triage, CI/CD gates in order, container hardening, and an incident playbook, with every finding scored and owned.

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    Supply Chain Security Assessment

    Supply Chain Security Assessment

    Example session with this skill installed

    Assess our supply chain before we ship v2.0. Small SaaS: one Node.js app, GitHub Actions CI, Docker deploy to a cloud host, roughly 180 npm dependencies. Here are the workflow files, lockfile, and Dockerfile.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the supply chain security

    SCOPE — One Node.js SaaS app, GitHub Actions CI, Docker deploy. Inputs seen: workflow files, lockfile, Dockerfile. No SBOM existed — generated from the production build as finding zero: 187 components vs 162 in the manifest.

    THREAT RANKING — Maintainer compromise and stale components first (187 transitive dependencies), CI injection second (one shared workflow, 9 contributors).

    FINDINGS (rubric-rated):

    • S-01 Critical, owner: release lead. Release workflow token carries broad write permissions and the image promotes unsigned. Impact: anyone who lands a workflow change can ship any artifact as a release. Fix: scope the token per job, sign the image, verify at admission. Due: 48 hours.
    • S-02 Critical. Reachable, publicly exploited flaw in a transitive file-upload parser. Fix: upgrade, retest by SBOM diff. Due: 48 hours.
    • S-03 High. Five third-party actions pinned to floating major-version tags. Fix: pin to full commit hashes. Due: 7 days.
    • S-04 High. Reachable flaw in the session library on the login path. Fix: upgrade. Due: 7 days.
    • S-05 Medium. Container runs as root from a full base image on a floating tag; the OS layer was never scanned. Fix: pin by digest, minimal base, non-root user, scan all layers. Due: 30 days.
      Backlog: 41 scanner findings not reachable on current call paths — review date set, re-triage on the next SBOM diff.

    DECISION — Ship is blocked on S-01 and S-02 only. Everything else carries an owner and a date inside its rubric window, and the incident playbook now names who scopes, contains, and rebuilds for this project.

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    A defensive assessment method for the supply chains you own: your dependencies, your CI/CD pipeline, and your containers. It starts by ranking five attack vectors — dependency confusion and typosquatting, maintainer compromise, build tampering, CI injection, and stale components — against the actual shape of your project, so the audit spends time where your risk really is. The SBOM becomes the inventory of record: generated from the build rather than the manifest, covering transitive dependencies, and diffed in review so a dependency change nobody reviewed cannot slip through. Scanner output is triaged by reachability, exploitability in your context, and known exploitation instead of raw count or base score, which is how reachable mediums stop hiding behind unreachable criticals. The pipeline itself is gated in order — secrets, dependencies, build integrity with signing and provenance, and admission verification — and assessed before dependency findings are ranked, because one over-permissioned workflow compromises every artifact it produces. Containers are hardened as a ladder: minimal pinned base images, per-layer scanning, signing, and restrictive runtime policy. Every finding is filed on a standard template, rated on a four-row scoring rubric with fixed response windows, and given an owner and a retest step. A worked example runs a full pre-launch assessment on a small web service, and the closing incident playbook — scope, contain, rebuild, verify, harden — is written before you need it.

    Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for DevOps & Cloud.

    • It directs and structures the assessment; it does not run your scanners or read your pipeline directly — you supply the workflow files, lockfiles, and scanner output.
    • Reachability calls are only as good as the inventory and call-path information you provide; an incomplete SBOM caps the accuracy of the triage.
    • Rubric ratings are calibrated judgment for prioritization, not a compliance certification; regulated environments may also need a formal audit.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

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      Sign in to Agensi

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    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

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    Listed24 days ago
    Updated21 days ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    No. It is a defensive assessment method for supply chains you own, and the frontmatter says so outright. Vendor components are assessed from your side only — your pinning, your intake checks, your exposure — and nothing in the skill probes a third-party system.

    Triage and order. The skill turns raw scanner output into a rated findings file: reachability first, then exploitability in your context, then known exploitation, each finding scored on a rubric with a response window, an owner, and a retest step. It also assesses the pipeline itself, which scanners of your dependency list never see.

    With generating one from the actual build. That is treated as finding zero, because triage, incident scoping, and the remediation plan all read from the inventory — and the gap between a build-derived SBOM and the manifest is itself a common first finding.

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