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Srednoff Smart Contract Source And Invariant Review
Solidity maintainer: revision/chain/role/asset-flow threat model, invariant-to-actor/handler matrix, Foundry test design and review findings grounded in supplied contract evidence.
$11.99
Srednoff Smart Contract Source And Invariant Review
Example session with this skill installed
Review the supplied vault source and design solvency invariants.
- Read your context and instructions
- Compiled the srednoff smart contract
Expected report shape, not a completed real audit: Scope And Revision; Chain And Source Correspondence; Role And Asset Flow Threat Model
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About this skill
Srednoff Smart Contract Source And Invariant Review
One-Line Outcome
Deliver a scoped contract threat model, evidence-linked source findings and invariant-to-actor/handler test specification. Not a formal professional audit, scanner, formal proof, implemented Foundry suite or guarantee of vulnerability detection.
Short Description
Generic audit checklists miss contract-specific authority, asset accounting and stateful test coverage, while green fuzz summaries can conceal vacuous handlers.
Problem It Solves
Generic audit checklists miss contract-specific authority, asset accounting and stateful test coverage, while green fuzz summaries can conceal vacuous handlers.
Solidity maintainer: revision/chain/role/asset-flow threat model, invariant-to-actor/handler matrix, Foundry test design and review findings grounded in supplied contract evidence.
What You Get
- Scope And Revision
- Chain And Source Correspondence
- Role And Asset Flow Threat Model
- External Call And Reentrancy Paths
- Upgrade And Storage Review
- Oracle And Token Assumptions
- Evidence Reviewed
- Findings
- Rejected Hypotheses
- Invariant Actor Handler Matrix
- Fuzz And Mutation Test Design
- Missing Evidence
- Residual Risk
- Prioritized Remediation
- Retest And Compatibility Risk
How It Works
- Pin review revision, compiler, dependencies, chain/fork assumptions and source correspondence. Separate design/source review from deployed-bytecode claims; no chain contact is implied.
- Inventory assets, privileged roles, upgrade authority, entry points, external dependencies and intended state transitions. Mark unsupported tokens, chains and oracle behaviors explicitly.
- Trace state changes across entry points and external calls. Review reentrancy through callbacks, cross-function/shared state and dependent contracts, without assuming one guard covers every path.
- Review access control on initialization, role grants, privileged setters, rescue/pause operations and upgrade authorization; distinguish intended governance powers from accidental public authority.
- Inspect external-call target control, return handling, failure propagation, delegatecall context and denial-of-service exposure. No live exploit or adversarial transaction is produced.
- Review proxy initialization, implementation locking, upgrade paths and storage compatibility using supplied versions/layouts; compiler declarations alone do not prove deployed state.
- Trace oracle units, sign, update time and application-specific freshness/chain assumptions. Treat unavailable or stale feeds as separate branches; do not invent a universal heartbeat or deprecated round requirement.
- Reconcile token accounting with supported fees, rebases, decimals, transfer return behavior, donations and rounding. Define liabilities and recoverable assets without assuming exact balance equality for every design.
- Specify invariants with domain, actor, reachable state, handlers/selectors, independent accounting oracle and permitted exceptions. Include solvency, role constraints, conservation and bounded rounding where applicable.
- Design isolated Foundry fixtures, stateful handlers and fuzz campaigns with valid/invalid inputs, meaningful transition counts and explicit revert policy. Avoid assumptions that remove the behavior under test.
- Require a meaningful local mutation to violate the intended assertion, a minimized counterexample and reproducibility metadata before accepting a supplied campaign as non-vacuous evidence. Do not claim execution from a written test plan.
- Deliver source findings, rejected hypotheses, evidence gaps and a prioritized retest specification. Remediation changes require explicit approval; deployment, upgrades, signing and broadcasts remain outside this workflow.
Best For
Solidity maintainers defining a revision-bound security review and meaningful invariant test design
Example Tasks
- Review the supplied vault source and design solvency invariants.
- Map reentrancy and role boundaries without live calls.
- Assess upgrade storage compatibility from pinned layouts.
- Review whether the supplied fuzz campaign is vacuous or misses token/oracle assumptions.
Inputs
- Authorized defensive scope, source revision, compiler settings, dependency versions and contract inventory
- Sanitized chain assumptions, deployment/source correspondence evidence, proxy/implementation and storage layouts if applicable
- Privileged-role model, asset flows, supported token/oracle semantics and intended economic properties
- Existing local test code and sanitized traces if available, including toolchain, seed, configuration and fork block; no keys or live signatures
Outputs
- Scope And Revision
- Chain And Source Correspondence
- Role And Asset Flow Threat Model
- External Call And Reentrancy Paths
- Upgrade And Storage Review
- Oracle And Token Assumptions
- Evidence Reviewed
- Findings
- Rejected Hypotheses
- Invariant Actor Handler Matrix
- Fuzz And Mutation Test Design
- Missing Evidence
- Residual Risk
- Prioritized Remediation
- Retest And Compatibility Risk
Permissions
Read-only review of owner-supplied artifacts by default. Report file writes, shell/local fixture execution and official documentation lookup are optional, require available tools and their explicit scope. No live credentials are requested.
Compatibility
Standalone workflow, no Srednoff OS dependency. Codex evidence is synthetic entrypoint text only when recorded below. Claude Code, Cursor and actual buyer-runtime task delivery remain UNTESTED. Provider/platform-specific contracts must be refreshed for the installed version.
Limitations
This is an instruction/evidence workflow, not a hosted security service, persistent enforcement engine, production certification or business guarantee. The optional Python helper checks supplied claims, not underlying source artifacts. Agensi delivery is agent-only: do not save/export proprietary skill files to run local helpers; disclose NOT_EXECUTED where execution is unavailable.
Validation Transparency
Offline evidence-precheck status: PASS. Authored synthetic text-response cases: 24/24, status PASS. This is not independent security testing, complete artifact inspection or proof of deployment safety. Exact-text hashes and attempts are retained separately.
License And Publisher
Commercial License 1.0 covers original new expression; historical MIT and third-party rights remain unchanged. Mandatory marketplace conditions prevail. Publisher: Ivan Srednoff / Srednoff.Agency. No proprietary source resale or off-platform paid upsell is included.
FAQ
What is different from a generic security request? Solidity maintainer: revision/chain/role/asset-flow threat model, invariant-to-actor/handler matrix, Foundry test design and review findings grounded in supplied contract evidence. No formal professional audit, exploit toolkit, guaranteed vulnerability detection, installed scanner, live transaction, deployment or claim of executed fuzzing without traces.
Does it change production automatically? No. Audit/design is the default; changes, secret rotation, IAM, network probes and financial actions need separate explicit authorization.
Are the examples real incidents? No. They are synthetic DEMO DATA.
Is this a certification or guaranteed protection? No. Evidence gaps, residual risk and unexecuted tests remain explicit.
Can I use project-specific reports for clients? Yes under the included license; proprietary workflow source is not a client deliverable.
Version
1.0.0
Release Notes
Initial scoped security workflow with domain decision rules, evidence requirements, synthetic examples, regression cases and explicit authorization/runtime limits. No production/customer outcome is claimed.
Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for Security.
This is an instruction/evidence workflow, not a hosted security service, persistent enforcement engine, production certification or business guarantee. The optional Python helper checks supplied claims, not underlying source artifacts. Agensi delivery is agent-only: do not save/export proprietary skill files to run local helpers; disclose NOT_EXECUTED where execution is unavailable.
How to use
- 1
Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP
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- 2
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- 3
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Nothing to install. It runs in your AI agent.
- Optional
Python 3
No external account, API key or Srednoff OS installation is required. Supply authorized sanitized task evidence. Owner-authorized project inspection tools where available.