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    Srednoff OAuth 2.0 / OIDC Security Design Review

    1

    This is a defensive review workflow, not an identity provider, runtime verifier or automatic architect/deployer.

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    Srednoff OAuth 2.0 / OIDC Security Design Review

    Example session with this skill installed

    Review the supplied confidential web client's code/PKCE callback and issuer-bound transaction design.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the srednoff oauth 2

    Expected report shape, not a completed real audit: Executive Summary; Scope And Revision; Assets / Trust Boundaries

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    Srednoff OAuth 2.0 / OIDC Security Design Review

    One-Line Outcome

    Produce a client-specific OAuth/OIDC trust-boundary design, callback decision table and approval-gated remediation plan from supplied evidence. This is a defensive review workflow, not an identity provider, runtime verifier or automatic architect/deployer.

    Short Description

    A provider quickstart can produce a successful login while leaving callback ownership, cross-provider identity linking, cancelled transactions and logout guarantees undefined.

    Problem It Solves

    A provider quickstart can produce a successful login while leaving callback ownership, cross-provider identity linking, cancelled transactions and logout guarantees undefined.

    SaaS identity engineer: provider/version-specific code-PKCE and callback/account-linking trust model, redirect/state/nonce matrix and abuse-case design.

    What You Get

    • Executive Summary
    • Scope And Revision
    • Assets / Trust Boundaries
    • Client / Provider Capability Matrix
    • Authorization And Callback Decision Table
    • Account-Linking And Logout Guarantees
    • Evidence Reviewed
    • Threat Model
    • Findings
    • Critical Findings
    • Quick Wins
    • Prioritized Remediation Plan
    • Missing Evidence
    • Unknown Provider Assumptions
    • Residual Risk
    • Verification Checklist
    • Rollback / Compatibility Risk

    How It Works

    1. Pin scope and distinguish design-only from implemented-flow review. Inventory browser, native OS, backend, authorization server, resource server and local account store; assign an owner to each boundary.
    2. Classify every client and intended outcome: delegated authorization is not proof of login. Build a provider capability table from approved metadata and documentation, leaving unverified capabilities UNKNOWN.
    3. Trace authorization initiation into a short-lived, single-use transaction record carrying expected issuer, redirect, browser/session binding and post-login destination. Compare error and cancellation paths with the success path.
    4. Review code flow with transaction-specific PKCE S256. Inspect verifier custody and exchange binding; identify implicit or password-grant migration needs without turning off legacy flows automatically.
    5. Reconcile registered redirects with effective callback routing and proxy-origin configuration. Check exact matching, open redirects and native-loopback exceptions against the actual client type rather than a blanket HTTPS rule.
    6. Construct a callback reject/accept table for missing, duplicate, expired, replayed or cross-session transaction data, unexpected issuer and provider error. Record the CSRF defense actually used; state and nonce are not interchangeable magic flags.
    7. For OIDC, locate the established SDK verification path for signature, issuer, client audience, applicable authorized-party checks, expiry and transaction nonce when used. Map verified issuer/subject to local identity before creating the session.
    8. Inspect account-linking intent separately from initial login: require evidence of control of the existing local account and incoming external identity. Identify email-based merge and provider-switch ambiguity without attempting a takeover.
    9. Map requested scopes and resource audiences to user-visible purposes. Review refresh custody and provider rotation/reuse semantics at design level; hand detailed per-service token lifecycle analysis to concept52/product54.
    10. Separate local logout, provider logout and downstream access-token validity. Review registered post-logout destinations and supported provider mechanisms; document what remains usable rather than promising universal single logout.
    11. Design bounded local tests for valid, cancelled, concurrent and replayed logins, failed token exchange, issuer mismatch and safe native return. Tests remain NOT_EXECUTED unless an authorized trace is supplied.
    12. Deliver the decision record, provider-assumption ledger, evidence-linked findings and compatibility-aware retest plan. Any registration change, secret rotation, revocation or production rollout needs separate explicit authorization and a reviewed rollback.

    Best For

    Identity engineers and application security leads reviewing a federated login or delegated-access design before implementation or migration

    Example Tasks

    • Review the supplied confidential web client's code/PKCE callback and issuer-bound transaction design.
    • Assess whether our two-provider account-linking and logout proposal preserves local account ownership.
    • Review a native OAuth loopback callback design without applying browser-only redirect assumptions.
    • Build a provider-specific error, cancellation and concurrent-login decision table from these sanitized artifacts.

    Inputs

    • Authorized review scope, environment, code revision and client types: confidential web app, browser-only app or native app.
    • Provider identities and versions, sanitized registration/metadata exports, allowed redirects, grant/response types and SDK configuration; no client secrets.
    • Login initiation, callback, identity mapping, linking and logout code or proposed sequence diagrams with artifact locations.
    • Sanitized transaction-state model, scope/resource inventory and existing local test assertions; identify any missing artifacts explicitly.

    Outputs

    • Executive Summary
    • Scope And Revision
    • Assets / Trust Boundaries
    • Client / Provider Capability Matrix
    • Authorization And Callback Decision Table
    • Account-Linking And Logout Guarantees
    • Evidence Reviewed
    • Threat Model
    • Findings
    • Critical Findings
    • Quick Wins
    • Prioritized Remediation Plan
    • Missing Evidence
    • Unknown Provider Assumptions
    • Residual Risk
    • Verification Checklist
    • Rollback / Compatibility Risk

    Permissions

    Read-only review of owner-supplied artifacts by default. Report file writes, shell/local fixture execution and official documentation lookup are optional, require available tools and their explicit scope. No live credentials are requested.

    Compatibility

    Standalone workflow, no Srednoff OS dependency. Codex evidence is synthetic entrypoint text only when recorded below. Claude Code, Cursor and actual buyer-runtime task delivery remain UNTESTED. Provider/platform-specific contracts must be refreshed for the installed version.

    Limitations

    This is an instruction/evidence workflow, not a hosted security service, persistent enforcement engine, production certification or business guarantee. The optional Python helper checks supplied claims, not underlying source artifacts. Agensi delivery is agent-only: do not save/export proprietary skill files to run local helpers; disclose NOT_EXECUTED where execution is unavailable.

    Validation Transparency

    Offline evidence-precheck status: PASS. Authored synthetic text-response cases: 16/16, status PASS. This is not independent security testing, complete artifact inspection or proof of deployment safety. Exact-text hashes and attempts are retained separately.

    License And Publisher

    Commercial License 1.0 covers original new expression; historical MIT and third-party rights remain unchanged. Mandatory marketplace conditions prevail. Publisher: Ivan Srednoff / Srednoff.Agency. No proprietary source resale or off-platform paid upsell is included.

    FAQ

    What is different from a generic security request? SaaS identity engineer: provider/version-specific code-PKCE and callback/account-linking trust model, redirect/state/nonce matrix and abuse-case design. No MCP OAuth audit, Telegram initData verification, generic JWT lifecycle audit, browser-cookie hardening or identity-provider installation.

    Does it change production automatically? No. Audit/design is the default; changes, secret rotation, IAM, network probes and financial actions need separate explicit authorization.

    Are the examples real incidents? No. They are synthetic DEMO DATA.

    Is this a certification or guaranteed protection? No. Evidence gaps, residual risk and unexecuted tests remain explicit.

    Can I use project-specific reports for clients? Yes under the included license; proprietary workflow source is not a client deliverable.

    Version

    1.0.0

    Release Notes

    Initial scoped security workflow with domain decision rules, evidence requirements, synthetic examples, regression cases and explicit authorization/runtime limits. No production/customer outcome is claimed.

    Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for Security.

    This is an instruction/evidence workflow, not a hosted security service, persistent enforcement engine, production certification or business guarantee. The optional Python helper checks supplied claims, not underlying source artifacts. Agensi delivery is agent-only: do not save/export proprietary skill files to run local helpers; disclose NOT_EXECUTED where execution is unavailable.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

      Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.

    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before buying a skill.

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    Security scan

    Security scan passed 1 day ago

    Nothing to install. It runs in your AI agent.

    Optional
    Python 3

    No external account, API key or Srednoff OS installation is required. Supply authorized sanitized task evidence. Owner-authorized project inspection tools where available.

    Permissions

    Terminal / Shell
    Listed1 day ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Produce a client-specific OAuth/OIDC trust-boundary design, callback decision table and approval-gated remediation plan from supplied evidence. This is a defensive review workflow, not an identity provider, runtime verifier or automatic architect/deployer.

    This skill uses the open SKILL.md standard. Use it through an MCP-compatible agent connected to Agensi, and check the compatibility information on this page for confirmed agents and required capabilities.

    Connect your AI agent to Agensi through MCP, then ask it to use Srednoff OAuth 2.0 / OIDC Security Design Review on your task. Your agent loads the latest approved version each time. Paid skills require a purchase or active subscription. Skill files are not available for download; your licence does not allow you to save, copy or export any part of a skill.

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