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    Srednoff Multi-Tenant Authorization Boundary Review

    1

    This flagship is a scoped defensive workflow, not a runtime scanner, RLS enforcement engine or formal penetration-test certification.

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    Srednoff Multi-Tenant Authorization Boundary Review

    Example session with this skill installed

    Review tenant isolation across our API, actual PostgreSQL request role and privileged export worker using sanitized evidence.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the srednoff multi-tenant authorization

    Expected report shape, not a completed real audit: Executive Summary; Scope And Revision; Assets / Trust Boundaries

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    Srednoff Multi-Tenant Authorization Boundary Review

    One-Line Outcome

    Produce an evidence-linked tenant-boundary map, actor/resource/action matrix and cross-path isolation review with prioritized remediation and a two-tenant safe retest plan. This flagship is a scoped defensive workflow, not a runtime scanner, RLS enforcement engine or formal penetration-test certification.

    Short Description

    A tenant filter on the main API does not establish isolation when service roles bypass policies, workers lose context, caches share protected values or exports and analytics use different authorization paths.

    Problem It Solves

    A tenant filter on the main API does not establish isolation when service roles bypass policies, workers lose context, caches share protected values or exports and analytics use different authorization paths.

    SaaS security lead: tenant/resource/principal authorization matrix, cross-tenant path findings and two-tenant negative test specification.

    What You Get

    • Executive Summary
    • Scope And Revision
    • Assets / Trust Boundaries
    • Tenant Data Classification And Sharing Exceptions
    • Actor / Resource / Action Matrix
    • Trusted Tenant Context Lineage
    • Effective Database Role / Policy Matrix
    • Cache / Storage / Job / Export / Analytics Boundary Ledger
    • Administrative Exception Register
    • Evidence Reviewed
    • Threat Model
    • Findings
    • Critical Findings
    • Quick Wins
    • Prioritized Remediation Plan
    • Missing Evidence
    • Unknowns And Coverage Limits
    • Residual Risk
    • Two-Tenant Verification Checklist
    • Rollback / Compatibility Risk

    How It Works

    1. Pin scope, revision and the tenant-owned versus deliberately shared data classes. Inventory tenant users, tenant admins, platform support, machine principals and maintenance jobs; define allowed cross-tenant exceptions before testing.
    2. Build an actor/resource/action matrix for read, list, create, update, move, delete, export, analytics and administrative operations. Record where identity authentication stops and tenant authorization begins.
    3. Trace every tenant selector from URL/header/body/subdomain/token to server-verified authority. A caller-selected tenant may be legitimate only after membership or scoped machine authority is checked; reconcile conflicting selectors and stale membership policy.
    4. Map object and function authorization at each ingress: tenant membership alone does not confer resource ownership, administrative action or field-level mutation rights. Include batch and nested resource paths, not only detail reads.
    5. Follow data access through repositories, raw SQL, joins, search, views and administrative functions. Review both reads and writes, including creation tenant assignment and attempted tenant reassignment; parameterization does not establish tenant ownership.
    6. For each database boundary record actual role, ownership, policies and applicable bypass conditions. On PostgreSQL distinguish enabled RLS from effective policy enforcement; review command coverage, USING/WITH CHECK, combined policies and privileged/security-definer paths against the named database version.
    7. Inspect connection/transaction tenant context: how it is set from trusted authority, bounded to the operation, cleared after error/cancellation and isolated under pool reuse. A client-supplied tenant session variable is not itself a security boundary.
    8. Review tenant-admin and platform-support overrides separately. Trace the authority granting cross-tenant access, scoped target/reason/expiry, audit and revalidation; do not equate a generic admin flag with legitimate platform authority.
    9. Classify cached results as global, tenant or user/permission scoped. Trace authorization before cache reads, result-varying key dimensions and invalidation after role/membership changes; examine shared CDN/report caches where in scope.
    10. Review storage path ownership and effective access policies independently. Follow authorized object selection through signing/download and background generation; a tenant prefix or hard-to-guess URL is not proof of isolation.
    11. Trace jobs from enqueue through execution, retry and dead-letter replay. Bind trusted tenant context and scoped service/delegated authority to each effect; apply the documented membership/revocation policy and prevent context reuse between jobs.
    12. Trace exports as create, generate, store, poll and download operations. Review each authorization boundary, tenant-specific artifact/cache scope, signed-link lifetime and ownership after membership changes.
    13. Review analytics, aggregate endpoints, search indexes and scheduled reports against data-classification and allowed sharing rules. An approved public aggregate is not equivalent to leaking tenant-specific rows; identify exact dimensions and access decisions.
    14. Review webhook tenant resolution from an authenticated integration mapping to authorized business effect. Signature correctness alone does not authorize a payload's tenant field; leave provider raw-body/signature mechanics to the existing Webhook add-on.
    15. Construct a bounded synthetic two-tenant matrix across direct API, actual request-role database path, privileged worker, cache, storage, export and analytics. Include allowed paths, cross-tenant denials, missing context, stale authority, retries and deliberate global sharing; mark absent runs NOT_EXECUTED.
    16. Reconcile static source with sanitized test/role evidence and report per-surface PASS, GAP, UNKNOWN or NOT_APPLICABLE. Overall scope remains incomplete when a material path is unreviewed; no isolation score may hide an unknown privileged path.
    17. Deliver findings, exception register and sequenced remediation proposals with owners and compatibility risks. Changes to IAM/RLS, grants, queries, storage policies, cache invalidation, production jobs or exports require explicit approval; retest allowed and denied paths without restoring insecure access as rollback.

    Best For

    SaaS security leads, backend owners and data-platform engineers assessing tenant isolation across synchronous and asynchronous data paths

    Example Tasks

    • Review tenant isolation across our API, actual PostgreSQL request role and privileged export worker using sanitized evidence.
    • Determine whether a caller-selected tenant header is checked against membership before reaching the query.
    • Assess cache, storage and analytics boundaries that bypass the main tenant-scoped repository.
    • Produce a two-tenant allow/deny retest matrix for jobs, webhook mappings and support overrides.

    Inputs

    • Authorized review boundaries, environments, candidate revision, tenant/data classification and intended sharing model, including approved global data and support exceptions.
    • Sanitized principal/membership/role model, tenant selection logic and representative API/read/write/query paths with artifact locations.
    • Database/schema/policy definitions and effective request/worker role descriptions, ownership, grants, connection-pool and transaction-context behavior; no live credentials or data dumps.
    • Cache keys and authorization order, storage naming/access rules, job payload/worker code, export lifecycle, analytics/report paths and webhook-to-tenant mapping evidence.
    • Existing synthetic two-tenant tests, revision/date metadata and declared revocation/delegation semantics; identify omitted surfaces rather than claiming full coverage.

    Outputs

    • Executive Summary
    • Scope And Revision
    • Assets / Trust Boundaries
    • Tenant Data Classification And Sharing Exceptions
    • Actor / Resource / Action Matrix
    • Trusted Tenant Context Lineage
    • Effective Database Role / Policy Matrix
    • Cache / Storage / Job / Export / Analytics Boundary Ledger
    • Administrative Exception Register
    • Evidence Reviewed
    • Threat Model
    • Findings
    • Critical Findings
    • Quick Wins
    • Prioritized Remediation Plan
    • Missing Evidence
    • Unknowns And Coverage Limits
    • Residual Risk
    • Two-Tenant Verification Checklist
    • Rollback / Compatibility Risk

    Permissions

    Read-only review of owner-supplied artifacts by default. Report file writes, shell/local fixture execution and official documentation lookup are optional, require available tools and their explicit scope. No live credentials are requested.

    Compatibility

    Standalone workflow, no Srednoff OS dependency. Codex evidence is synthetic entrypoint text only when recorded below. Claude Code, Cursor and actual buyer-runtime task delivery remain UNTESTED. Provider/platform-specific contracts must be refreshed for the installed version.

    Limitations

    This is an instruction/evidence workflow, not a hosted security service, persistent enforcement engine, production certification or business guarantee. The optional Python helper checks supplied claims, not underlying source artifacts. Agensi delivery is agent-only: do not save/export proprietary skill files to run local helpers; disclose NOT_EXECUTED where execution is unavailable.

    Validation Transparency

    Offline evidence-precheck status: PASS. Authored synthetic text-response cases: 28/28, status PASS. This is not independent security testing, complete artifact inspection or proof of deployment safety. Exact-text hashes and attempts are retained separately.

    License And Publisher

    Commercial License 1.0 covers original new expression; historical MIT and third-party rights remain unchanged. Mandatory marketplace conditions prevail. Publisher: Ivan Srednoff / Srednoff.Agency. No proprietary source resale or off-platform paid upsell is included.

    FAQ

    What is different from a generic security request? SaaS security lead: tenant/resource/principal authorization matrix, cross-tenant path findings and two-tenant negative test specification. No generic API rate-limit audit, full Firebase Rules assessment, cloud IAM policy audit, RLS disabling or production authorization changes.

    Does it change production automatically? No. Audit/design is the default; changes, secret rotation, IAM, network probes and financial actions need separate explicit authorization.

    Are the examples real incidents? No. They are synthetic DEMO DATA.

    Is this a certification or guaranteed protection? No. Evidence gaps, residual risk and unexecuted tests remain explicit.

    Can I use project-specific reports for clients? Yes under the included license; proprietary workflow source is not a client deliverable.

    Version

    1.0.0

    Release Notes

    Initial scoped security workflow with domain decision rules, evidence requirements, synthetic examples, regression cases and explicit authorization/runtime limits. No production/customer outcome is claimed.

    Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for Security.

    This is an instruction/evidence workflow, not a hosted security service, persistent enforcement engine, production certification or business guarantee. The optional Python helper checks supplied claims, not underlying source artifacts. Agensi delivery is agent-only: do not save/export proprietary skill files to run local helpers; disclose NOT_EXECUTED where execution is unavailable.

    How to use

    1. 1

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      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

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    3. 3

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    Security scan

    Security scan passed 1 day ago

    Nothing to install. It runs in your AI agent.

    Optional
    Python 3

    No external account, API key or Srednoff OS installation is required. Supply authorized sanitized task evidence. Owner-authorized project inspection tools where available.

    Permissions

    Terminal / Shell
    Listed1 day ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Produce an evidence-linked tenant-boundary map, actor/resource/action matrix and cross-path isolation review with prioritized remediation and a two-tenant safe retest plan. This flagship is a scoped defensive workflow, not a runtime scanner, RLS enforcement engine or formal penetration-test certific

    This skill uses the open SKILL.md standard. Use it through an MCP-compatible agent connected to Agensi, and check the compatibility information on this page for confirmed agents and required capabilities.

    Connect your AI agent to Agensi through MCP, then ask it to use Srednoff Multi-Tenant Authorization Boundary Review on your task. Your agent loads the latest approved version each time. Paid skills require a purchase or active subscription. Skill files are not available for download; your licence does not allow you to save, copy or export any part of a skill.

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