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pnpm Workspace Config Check
One line, dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds: true, lets every dependency you will ever install, transitive ones included, run code on your laptop and your CI runners during pnpm install.
$5
pnpm Workspace Config Check
Example session with this skill installed
Check this project with pnpm-workspace-config-check.
- Read your context and instructions
- Compiled the pnpm workspace config
$ python3 scripts/check_pnpm.py examples/risky
BLOCK .npmrc:1 P02 PLAIN_HTTP_REGISTRY
@acme:registry=http://npm.acme-shop.example.com/
Why: A registry, scoped registry, publish registry, override, catalog entry or lockfile tarball uses plain http:// to a host that is not this machine. Anyone on the network path can read the auth token pnpm sends and change the package metadata and tarballs that new installs receive.
Safer: Use https:// for every registry and tarball URL. If the registry uses a private certificate authority, point cafile at its certificate instead of falling back to http.
BLOCK .npmrc:2 P03 REGISTRY_CREDENTIAL_IN_FILE
BLOCK pnpm-workspace.yaml:6 P01 ALL_INSTALL_SCRIPTS_ALLOWED
BLOCK pnpm-workspace.yaml:23 P04 TLS_VERIFICATION_OFF
BLOCK pnpm-workspace.yaml:30 P02 PLAIN_HTTP_REGISTRY
REVIEW .npmrc:4 P18 ENV_PLACEHOLDER_NOT_EXPANDED
REVIEW .npmrc:5 P17 SETTING_PNPM_IGNORES
REVIEW package.json:14 P17 SETTING_PNPM_IGNORES
REVIEW pnpm-workspace.yaml:9 P11 BUILD_SCRIPTS_LOOSELY_ALLOWED
REVIEW pnpm-workspace.yaml:12 P17 SETTING_PNPM_IGNORES
REVIEW pnpm-workspace.yaml:16 P12 RELEASE_AGE_DELAY_OFF
REVIEW pnpm-workspace.yaml:17 P13 EXOTIC_SOURCE_ALLOWED
REVIEW pnpm-workspace.yaml:20 P14 PHANTOM_DEPENDENCY_HOISTING
REVIEW pnpm-workspace.yaml:26 P15 LOCKFILE_OFF_OR_MISSING
REVIEW pnpm-workspace.yaml:33 P16 MOVING_CATALOG_VERSION
REVIEW pnpm-workspace.yaml:34 P16 MOVING_CATALOG_VERSION
REVIEW pnpm-workspace.yaml:38 P13 EXOTIC_SOURCE_ALLOWED
REVIEW tools/legacy-importer/package.json:4 P11 BUILD_SCRIPTS_LOOSELY_ALLOWED
(Each finding also has Why and Safer lines, as in the first one.)
Verdict: BLOCK. Checked 5 files, 4 with pnpm content.
This is a static check of file text. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.
About this skill
One line, dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds: true, lets every dependency you will ever install, transitive ones included, run code on your laptop and your CI runners during pnpm install. Upgrading to pnpm 11 drops the overrides you kept in the package.json "pnpm" field to patch vulnerable versions, with only a warning: pnpm 11 no longer reads that field. And since pnpm 10.34.2 and 11.5.3, a ${NPM_TOKEN} line in the project .npmrc is no longer expanded, so installs fail and someone pastes the real token into the file. This skill finds those and the other pnpm mistakes below, and tells you how to fix each one.
Your agent runs a scanner on pnpm-workspace.yaml, every .npmrc, package.json files that belong to a pnpm project, and pnpm-lock.yaml. It knows what changed between pnpm versions (scripts blocked by default in pnpm 10; a one-day minimumReleaseAge, blockExoticSubdeps and allowBuilds in pnpm 11) and uses the project's packageManager pin to report only what applies to the pnpm version you use. It skips comments, accepts loopback registries, does not report a token in a .npmrc that .gitignore covers, and never runs pnpm or installs anything. It returns BLOCK, REVIEW, or NOT FLAGGED, with the file, line, reason, and a safer approach. Secrets are never printed.
What it checks
BLOCK
- P01: dangerouslyAllowAllBuilds: true, or an empty neverBuiltDependencies list on pnpm 10, so every dependency runs its install scripts
- P02: a plain http:// registry, scoped registry, publish registry, override, catalog entry or lockfile tarball (localhost is fine)
- P03: registry tokens, _auth or _password values, passwords in URLs, or npm, GitHub and GitLab tokens in committed pnpm files
- P04: strict-ssl=false or strictSsl: false
REVIEW
- P11: build approvals for git or tarball sources with no pinned commit, a neverBuiltDependencies deny-list, or a pin to pnpm 9 or older that runs every install script
- P12: the release-age delay turned off (minimumReleaseAge: 0, an exclude of '*'), or pnpm 10 with no minimumReleaseAge (and why to set it explicitly on pnpm 11 too)
- P13: overrides or catalog entries that point at git repositories or URLs, or blockExoticSubdeps: false
- P14: shamefully-hoist, a publicHoistPattern of '*', or the hoisted node linker (phantom dependencies)
- P15: lockfile turned off, no pnpm-lock.yaml at the workspace root, or the lockfile listed in .gitignore (example, template and fixture apps are left out)
- P16: catalog versions that move on their own: '*', latest or another dist-tag, '>=' with no upper bound
- P17: settings pnpm 11 and later do not apply: the package.json "pnpm" field, pnpm settings in .npmrc, and onlyBuiltDependencies and the other settings removed in pnpm 11 (pnpm 12 fails on them when the version pin matches)
- P18: ${VAR} placeholders in the project .npmrc auth, registry, proxy or client-certificate lines (or workspace registry and proxy URLs) that current pnpm no longer expands
What's included
- The scanner (Python 3.9+, standard library only)
- A rules guide with the reason, safer approach and official source for each rule
- A risky and a safe example monorepo (pnpm-workspace.yaml, .npmrc, package.json files and a lockfile), and the real report the scanner produces on the risky one
Limits It reads the project's files only: settings in the user-level ~/.npmrc, pnpm's global config.yaml and auth.ini, environment variables and command-line flags are not known. Lockfiles larger than 1 MB are skipped. A file named on its own is checked without its folder's lockfile and version pin. .pnpmfile hooks, configDependencies, patches and the packages themselves are not inspected, and dependency versions are not checked against vulnerability databases. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for Security.
Static check of config text. Settings outside the project (user and global config, environment variables, CLI flags) are not known, lockfiles over 1 MB are skipped, and without a packageManager pin, rules for both pnpm 10 and pnpm 11 and later are reported. NOT FLAGGED is not a guarantee.
How to use
- 1
Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP
Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup
- 2
Sign in to Agensi
Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.
- 3
Ask for what you need
Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before buying a skill.
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Permissions
Runs one local Python script in the terminal. It reads your project's files, writes nothing, and makes no network calls. The example project includes a clearly fake, inert registry token (NOTREAL-...) for the scanner to find. Nothing in it is run.