Openclaw Hardening Audit

    1

    Audit OpenClaw installations and third-party skills for security misconfigurations and supply-chain risks.

    Free

    2 usesSecurity scanned

    Works with the AI Agents you already use

    Claude CodeClaude CodeCursorCursorCodex CLICodex CLIDeepSeekDeepSeekMuseMuse+22 more

    Openclaw Hardening Audit

    Example session with this skill installed

    Audit my OpenClaw install at ~/.openclaw and check this SKILL.md I found on GitHub for any red flags before I add it.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the openclaw hardening audit

    Audit completed for path ~/.openclaw. Found 1 Critical, 1 High, and 1 Medium risk findings. The external SKILL.md is flagged as

    Malicious and should not be installed.

    OpenClaw Hardening Report

    CategoryFindingSeverityRisk
    Skill AuditCredential Exfiltration PatternCRITICALThe provided SKILL.md attempts to read ~/.openclaw/credentials/ and send contents to an external URL.
    GatewayBind Host 0.0.0.0HIGHThe gateway is exposed to all network interfaces, allowing remote access if the port is reachable.
    WorkspaceMissing Injection DefenseMEDIUMAGENTS.md lacks rules for handling untrusted external content (web/email).

    Detailed Findings

    [CRITICAL] Malicious Skill Pattern Detected

    The external skill you provided contains a trigger that attempts to cat files in the credentials directory and pipe them to a curl command. This is a documented exfiltration technique.

    Do not install this skill.

    [HIGH] Global Gateway Binding

    Your openclaw.json has gateway.bindHost set to 0.0.0.0. This makes the agent's control interface accessible from the public internet or local network.

    [MEDIUM] Weak Workspace Hardening

    AGENTS.md does not explicitly instruct the agent to treat web search results as untrusted. This leaves the system vulnerable to indirect prompt injection where a malicious website could take control of the session.

    Next steps

    1. Delete the malicious SKILL.md immediately and do not attempt to run it.
    2. Edit ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json to set gateway.bindHost to 127.0.0.1.
    3. Add defensive instructions to AGENTS.md regarding untrusted data sources.
    Delete the malicious SKILL.md

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    The problem

    OpenClaw gives LLMs shell access, browser control, and file system reach, often with unsafe defaults. With over 135,000 internet-exposed instances and a rise in malicious skills targeting credentials, a standard installation is a significant security liability.

    What it does

    • Audits openclaw.json for critical gateway exposure, weak authentication tokens, and overprivileged tool permissions.
    • Inspects SKILL.md files for supply-chain risks, including credential exfiltration patterns, obfuscated payloads, and prompt-injection vulnerabilities.
    • Checks workspace instruction files like AGENTS.md and SOUL.md for missing defensive boundaries against indirect prompt injection.
    • Cross-references the local OpenClaw version against known CVEs and identifies dangerous file-system permission sets.

    Frameworks & tools

    Built for OpenClaw installations, ClawHub skills, and MCP server configurations. Uses stat, ls, and the OpenClaw CLI for non-intrusive inspection.

    Why this beats prompting it yourself

    General LLMs often overlook the specific "indirect injection" risks unique to OpenClaw's browser and email tools. This skill uses a specialized reference library of known malicious patterns and CVE histories that standard models lack in their base training.

    Use cases

    • Vetting third-party skills from community repos before installation.
    • Hardening a fresh OpenClaw deployment before giving it access to sensitive data.
    • Conducting regular security posture reviews of production agents.
    • Investigating agents that are exhibiting suspicious or out-of-character behavior.

    Known limitations

    Does not perform memory forensics or log analysis to detect past compromises. The CVE reference library requires manual verification against live advisories for the most recent threats.

    Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for Agents & Orchestration.

    Does not detect past compromises via logs or memory forensics. CVE data is a floor, not a live feed. Cannot audit MCP server internals or OpenClaw source code.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

      Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.

    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before buying a skill.

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    Security scanned

    Checked by our 8-point scan before listing

    2 uses

    Times used to date

    Free to use

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    Trust & safety

    Security scan

    Security scan passed 2 months ago

    • Free with an Agensi account

    Permissions

    Read Files
    Write Files
    Terminal / Shell

    File Scopes

    ~/.openclaw/**
    Listed2 months ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    This skill scans your OpenClaw configuration files, skill definitions, and workspace instructions to identify security risks like overprivileged permissions, weak authentication, and potential prompt injection vulnerabilities. It acts as a specialized security layer to prevent your agent from being exploited via third-party integrations or malicious inputs.

    New in Agents & Orchestration

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