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    Leaked Secret Response: Rotate, Purge, Prevent

    1

    Agents also make it worse: they `cat` the `.env` file, echo the value into chat, or force-push a rewritten history without asking anyone.

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    Leaked Secret Response: Rotate, Purge, Prevent

    Leaked Secret Response: Rotate, Purge, Prevent

    Example session with this skill installed

    Our CI just failed on a secret-scanning step for PR #212 on our public repo. I think I committed our AWS keys in config/dev.env two commits ago and pushed. Can you sort this out?

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the leaked secret response

    Example session (illustrative).

    1. Located (redacted). gitleaks git --redact -v reports 2 findings, both in config/dev.env, introduced in commit 3f9c2e1:

    • aws-access-token at line 4 (key ID shown as AKIAEXAMPLE…, value REDACTED)
    • generic-api-key at line 5 (the matching secret access key, REDACTED)

    I have not opened or printed the file contents.

    2. Exposure: L4. git branch -r --contains 3f9c2e1 shows origin/feature/billing, and PR #212 is on a public repo. Treat these keys as compromised already. Bots harvest public pushes within minutes.

    3. Rotate now (you need to do this, or tell me to use the AWS CLI if it's configured):

    1. IAM console → Users → ci-deployer → Security credentials → Create access key. Put it in your secret manager or CI secrets, not in the repo.
    2. On the old key AKIAEXAMPLE…, choose Deactivate, then Delete.
    3. Check usage with aws iam get-access-key-last-used --access-key-id AKIAEXAMPLE… and look up that key ID in CloudTrail for the time it was exposed.

    4. Code fix (on the PR branch, waiting for your OK to push): config/dev.env is untracked and added to .gitignore. I added config/dev.env.example with placeholder names, and the app reads AWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID and AWS_SECRET_ACCESS_KEY from the environment.

    5. History purge needs your approval. Rewriting history means a force-push to a shared branch. Collaborators on feature/billing would have to reclone, and the PR may need re-opening. GitHub also keeps refs/pull/212/* and cached views until Support purges them. Forks and existing clones keep their copies whatever we do. If you approve, I'll run git filter-repo --sensitive-data-removal --invert-paths --path config/dev.env on a fresh clone, re-scan, and then git push --force --mirror origin.

    6. Prevention staged: a gitleaks pre-commit hook pinned to a release tag, and .gitleaks.toml extending the default rules.

    Status: NOT resolved until the old key is deleted in IAM and confirmed to fail.

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    The problem. When an agent finds a leaked credential, its instinct is to delete the line, commit, and announce "fixed". That leaves the key live in git history, in every clone, in forks, in CI logs, and in scraper databases that crawl public GitHub events within minutes. Agents also make it worse: they cat the .env file, echo the value into chat, or force-push a rewritten history without asking anyone.

    What the agent does with this skill.

    • Locates leaks with redaction on (gitleaks --redact) and refers to them by file, line, commit, and rule ID, never by value.
    • Classifies exposure from L0 (working tree only) to L4 (public repo, PR, CI log, published package) using git branch -r --contains and tag checks, and tells you plainly when rotation is mandatory.
    • Rotates before rewriting, and explains why: rotation is the only step that makes the leaked value worthless. It names where to revoke AWS keys, GitHub tokens, Stripe keys, GCP service-account keys, Slack tokens, database passwords, and private keys, including zero-downtime options such as Stripe's rotate-with-expiry and MySQL dual passwords.
    • Moves the value into environment variables or a secret manager.
    • Purges history with git filter-repo --sensitive-data-removal (or BFG) on a fresh clone. It does this only after you approve, and it spells out the coordination cost first. It covers the GitHub specifics: PR refs it cannot rewrite, contacting Support for cached views, and deleting Actions logs.
    • Verifies with gitleaks, then adds a pinned pre-commit hook, .gitignore entries, and a .gitleaks.toml that extends the default rules.

    Who it's for. Solo developers and teams who let Claude Code, Cursor, Codex CLI, or similar agents work in real repositories, and who want a leak handled as an incident.

    Requirements. git. gitleaks v8.25+ (the gitleaks git / gitleaks dir commands arrived in v8.19, global [[allowlists]] in v8.25). git-filter-repo 2.47+ for history purges (needed for --sensitive-data-removal). The provider's dashboard or CLI for rotation. It works without AgentHarness. If AgentHarness is installed, harness scan --staged is an optional pre-commit extra.

    Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for Security.

    Requires gitleaks and git-filter-repo to be installed locally. Cannot perform remote revocation without authenticated provider CLIs. Shared history rewrites require manual team coordination.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

      Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.

    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before buying a skill.

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    Software
    Gitgitleaksgit-filter-repo

    Permissions

    Terminal / Shell
    Read Files
    Network Access
    Listed17 days ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    No. Once a secret has been pushed, copies exist in clones, forks, CI caches, and possibly scraper databases, and you can't reach any of them. Revoking at the provider is the only step that makes the leaked value useless. History cleanup is hygiene that comes after.

    No. The skill forbids force-pushing, rewriting shared history, or deleting remote logs without your explicit approval for that specific action. Before asking, the agent explains the coordination cost.

    Usually you do it in the provider's dashboard, and the skill tells the agent exactly where to send you. If you ask it to and the provider's CLI is already authenticated (for example `aws` or `gcloud`), it can run the documented rotation commands.

    Yes. It relies on git, gitleaks, and git-filter-repo (BFG is covered as an alternative). If AgentHarness is installed, `harness scan --staged` is mentioned as an optional pre-commit check.

    That's exposure level L0. Rotation is recommended rather than mandatory, but it becomes mandatory if the value was synced, pasted somewhere, or read by an AI tool. The agent still moves the value into environment variables and adds `.gitignore` and hook prevention.

    New in Security