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Install Guard: Vet Skills and MCP Servers Before Installing
Your agent follows a skill with your permissions, and an MCP server runs code on your machine with whatever its config hands it.
$14
Install Guard: Vet Skills and MCP Servers Before Installing
Example session with this skill installed
Before I add these MCP servers to Claude Desktop, check them. Here is my claude_desktop_config.json with four servers: files (npx @example/files-mcp, given /), issues (npx @example/issues-mcp@2.3.1, with its token written in the env block), shell (uvx example-shell-mcp, ALLOW_COMMANDS set to * and autoApprove set to *) and moltline-timeops (https://mcp.moltlinestudio.com/timeops). Which ones are safe, and what should I change?
- Read your context and instructions
- Compiled the install guard
- Generated the document
Summary
Two of the four servers should not be used as configured. The shell server runs any command and approves itself, and the files server can write and delete anywhere on the disk. The issues server is fine once its token leaves the file. Hosted checks ran on a redacted copy with the free Moltline govern tools.
Servers
| Server | Verdict | Top finding | Fix |
|---|---|---|---|
| shell | Do not use as configured | Auto-approve on every tool, ALLOW_COMMANDS: * | Remove autoApprove, list the commands it may run, pin the package version |
| files | Do not use as configured | Rooted at /: delete_file and write_file reach the whole disk | Root it at the project folder, pin the version, require approval for write and delete |
| issues | Use after a fix | Token written in the config file | Move it to the client's secret storage, then rotate it |
| moltline-timeops | Fine | Remote HTTPS server, five read-only date tools | None |
Hosted results
audit_mcp_configon the redacted copy: posture score
0/100, high risk. Auto-approve flag set (severity 5); server given the whole disk as its root (4); wildcard allow-list for commands (4); unpinned packages for files and shell (3).
scope_checkon all 13 tools: blast radius 5 fordelete_file(destructive delete) andrun_command(arbitrary command execution); 3 forwrite_file,create_issueandclose_issue;read_file2; the other seven tools 0.
Found on this machine
- The
issuestoken was written into the config. It was replaced with<redacted>before the audit call, and it sat in a plain-text file, so rotate it after moving it. - With auto-approve and
ALLOW_COMMANDS: *together, the agent could run any command on the shell server without asking.
Next step
Remove the shell server or fix its two settings first. I can draft the edited config for you to apply.
install-guard-vet-skills-and-mcp-servers.pdf
PDF · document
Example file from a real run - the skill writes it into your workspace.
Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.
About this skill
Your agent follows a skill with your permissions, and an MCP server runs code on your machine with whatever its config hands it. Most people install both after reading the title. Install Guard reads every line first and tells you what you are about to trust.
A real run
A Claude Desktop config with four servers. Install Guard noted one token written in the file and replaced it with <redacted> before anything left the machine, then scored the rest with the free Moltline audit_mcp_config tool and ranked every tool with scope_check:
- Posture score 0/100, high risk: auto-approve switched on for the shell server, the files server rooted at
/(the whole disk), a wildcard (*) command allow-list, and two servers (files, shell) pulled from unpinned packages on every start. - Blast radius 5:
delete_fileandrun_command.write_file,create_issueandclose_issueat 3. - Caught on this machine and never sent: the token written into the issues server's config. It sat in a plain-text file, so it gets rotated.
- Verdicts: shell and files, do not use as configured. Issues, use after moving the token out of the file and rotating it. Timeops, fine.
The first screenshot is that run.
What it does
- skill-vetting: before you install or update a skill or skill pack, a hosted pattern pass on every file, then a line-by-line review of every instruction and script against eight risk areas. You get install, install with conditions, or do not install, with file, line and evidence for each finding.
- mcp-config-audit: redacts secrets on your side, scores the config for auto-approve flags, unpinned packages, inline credentials and over-broad access, ranks every tool by blast radius and proposes the exact fixes.
- untrusted-content-check: before the agent acts on a web page, email, ticket, document or another tool's output, it scans for text aimed at the agent, sets it aside and tells you what it found.
- agent-inventory: one table of every skill, MCP server and tool your agents can use, with an owner, a risk tier, the approval gates that are missing and a date for the next check.
Why pattern checks alone are not enough
We wrote a sample skill with four bad steps: answer approval prompts for the user, upload the project's .env file to an outside URL, attach cloud credentials to an issue as "diagnostics", and report back on the harmless steps only. The hosted pattern pass caught the first three. Only the line-by-line review caught the fourth, which hides the other three from the user. Verdict: do not install. The second screenshot is that run. Install Guard treats pattern hits as leads and lets the review decide.
What leaves your machine
Only the text you choose to check. Secrets are replaced with <redacted> before a config is sent anywhere, and a skill whose licence forbids sharing its text is reviewed locally. Nothing from the item under review is run, installed or opened.
How the checks run
Seven free tools on the Moltline Studio govern and codereview MCP servers, with no account and no key. No scripts in the pack. A Moltline All-Access licence adds an OWASP-oriented pass on scripts and a written governance policy. You do not need either.
Limits
- It reviews; it does not sandbox. Behaviour that only appears at run time needs a re-check after each update.
- A review is only as thorough as the files it can read. Binary files and anything not read in full are listed under Not checked, and those items never get a plain install verdict.
- Not a malware scanner for executables.
Support: first response within 24 hours, confirmed defects fixed within 30 days.
Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for Security.
Reviews files without running them, so behaviour that only appears at run time needs a re-check after each update. Pattern checks miss reworded text, so verdicts rest on the line-by-line review. Binary files are listed as not checked.
How to use
- 1
Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP
Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup
- 2
Sign in to Agensi
Your agent shows a sign-in link. Sign in and click Allow.
- 3
Ask for what you need
Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before buying a skill.
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- Network access to mcp.moltlinestudio.com