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    GitHub pull_request_target Block Fix (Dec 2, 2026): Audit, Migrate and Allow Workflows Safely

    1

    Find every workflow that stops running when GitHub blocks pull_request_target on December 2, 2026, fix each one with the safest pattern, and prove it with a scanner exit code.

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    GitHub pull_request_target Block Fix (Dec 2, 2026): Audit, Migrate and Allow Workflows Safely

    GitHub pull_request_target Block Fix (Dec 2, 2026): Audit, Migrate and Allow Workflows Safely

    Example session with this skill installed

    Our public repo had failed runs on Nov 9 about pull_request_target. Will our workflows break on December 2? Fix whatever needs fixing.

    • Read your context and instructions
    • Compiled the github pull_request_target block

    pull_request_target audit — acme/widget — 2026-11-12

    Deadline: 2026-12-02 (public repos, GitHub.com). Scanner exit before: 2, after: 1.

    Inventory

    WorkflowTriggersSecretsWrite tokenFetches fork codeExecutes itVerdict
    labeler.ymlpull_request_targetnopull-requests: writenonoB keep and allow
    lint.ymlpull_request_targetnononoyes (base branch)A switch
    preview.ymlpull_request_targetVERCEL_TOKENdefault (no block)yes, L9 head.shayes, npm ci/buildD fix now

    Scanner findings (preview.yml): CRITICAL pwn-request; HIGH L9 fork-checkout; HIGH L13 script-injection (pull_request.title in run:); MEDIUM L7 checkout pinned to v4.1.1; MEDIUM no permissions block.

    Changes

    • preview.yml disabled first (gh workflow disable "Preview deploy"), then rebuilt as pr-build.yml (pull_request, contents: read, uploads dist/ + validated PR number) and pr-preview.yml (workflow_run, deploys the static files only, VERCEL_TOKEN via env:).
    • lint.yml: trigger changed to pull_request, permissions: contents: read.
    • labeler.yml: unchanged; already least-privilege.

    Policies to create

    PolicyScopeWorkflow pathEvent allowed
    allow-prt-labeleracme/widget.github/workflows/labeler.ymlpull_request_target

    Verification

    CheckResult
    V1 scanner: no CRITICAL/HIGH (exit 1, one INFO for labeler)PASS
    V2 policy scoped to labeler.ymlPENDING (owner must create)
    V3 YAML parsesPASS
    V4 required check names unchanged ("lint", "build")PASS
    V5 fork test PRPENDING
    V6 Policy insightsPENDING
    labeler.yml

    Connects securely to your tools. The creator never sees your data.

    About this skill

    On December 2, 2026 GitHub Actions blocks pull_request_target by default in every public repository on GitHub.com unless an Actions event policy explicitly allows it. Labelers, preview deploys, coverage commenters and AI review bots that run on fork pull requests will stop silently. The first brownout ran on November 9; the next is November 16, 16:00–18:00 UTC.

    This skill gives your agent a complete, verified procedure:

    • Inventory: a bundled, read-only, standard-library Python scanner lists every pull_request_target, workflow_run and issue_comment workflow, flags fork checkouts, gh pr checkout/git fetch pull/ steps, allow-unsafe-pr-checkout, script injection, missing permissions: and unsafe actions/checkout pins. Exit codes 0/1/2 make it CI-friendly.
    • Classify: four verdicts (A switch to pull_request, B keep and allow with a file-scoped event policy, C split into pull_request + workflow_run, D fix-now pwn request) from four yes/no questions.
    • Fix: copy-ready, YAML-validated patterns for each verdict, including a safe artifact hand-off that validates the PR number and never executes fork output, comment-bot guards and the env: script-injection fix.
    • Allow: exact Settings → Actions → Policies steps and gh api checks for repository and organization policies.
    • Prove: a six-point PASS/FAIL verification table and a prt-audit.md report with diffs.

    Every rule is cited to GitHub's own changelog and docs, checked on 2026-11-12.

    Find more skills like this on the Claude Skills Marketplace, the Codex Skills Marketplace and the Gemini Skills Marketplace, or browse Claude Skills for Security.

    The scanner is line-based, not a full YAML parser, so the agent confirms each verdict by reading the file. It does not create Actions event policies for you (policy creation needs admin rights and is done in the GitHub UI). It covers GitHub.com public repositories; GitHub Enterprise Server and private/internal repositories are out of scope because the December 2 rule does not apply to them. Facts were checked on 2026-11-12; if GitHub changes the dates again, re-check the changelog.

    How to use

    1. 1

      Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP

      Copy the prompt and paste it into Claude, ChatGPT, Cursor or any agent that supports MCP. It sets up the connection for you. Manual setup

    2. 2

      Sign in to Agensi

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    3. 3

      Ask for what you need

      Your agent loads this skill and uses it on your task. It always asks before buying a skill.

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    Trust & safety

    Security scan

    Security scan passed 5 days ago

    Software
    Python 3.8+GitjestNode.js
    Optional
    GitHub CLIactionlint
    Repo
    ororg admin for policies

    Permissions

    File Scopes

    .github/workflows/
    prt-audit.md
    prt-scan.json

    The bundled scanner is read-only and makes no network calls. Optional gh commands contact api.github.com with the user's own GitHub CLI login.

    Listed5 days ago

    What's inside

    Frequently Asked Questions

    Public repositories on GitHub Free, Team and Enterprise Cloud that use pull_request_target and have no event policy explicitly allowing it. Private and internal repositories and GitHub Enterprise Server are not affected.

    For labelers and greeters that never fetch fork code, yes, and the skill shows how to scope the policy to that one workflow file. For workflows that check out and build fork code with secrets, allowing them keeps a pwn request open, so the skill rebuilds them as a pull_request + workflow_run split instead.

    Only partly. It refuses fork checkouts in pull_request_target and workflow_run, but it does not see gh pr checkout or git fetch in run steps, issue_comment bots, or SHA/minor pins older than the July 2026 backport. The scanner flags all of these.

    Every rule is cited to GitHub's changelog and docs, checked on 2026-11-12, including the November 16 brownout and the December 2 enforcement date.

    General audits list risky patterns. This skill is built around the December 2 enforcement: it tells you which workflows will stop, gives one verdict per workflow, ready patterns to migrate, the exact policy to create, and a PASS/FAIL proof.

    New in Security