Supabase Security Duo
Two read-only audits for a Supabase app, one for your tables and one for your file storage. The RLS & Policy Audit checks your database tables for missing row level security and policies that let the wrong people read or change data. The Storage & Bucket Audit checks your buckets, storage policies, signed URLs and, if you want, your app code for file links that last too long or keys that ended up in the browser. Both give you a ranked report with a suggested fix and an undo for each problem, and neither changes anything unless you approve it. Bought separately they're $36.
Works with any agent that signs in to Agensi, such as Claude, ChatGPT, Claude Code, Cursor and Codex CLI.
One payment, lifetime access. 2 skills unlock instantly in your library.
What's included
2 skillsRead-only audit of your Supabase row level security that goes past the built-in Security Advisor: fix and undo SQL for every finding, "any signed-in user" policies, partitions, FORCE RLS, Storage write rules and a code scan for leaked key names. Changes nothing.
Read-only audit of Supabase Storage: public buckets that hold private-looking files, missing upload limits, bucket policies that let users read or overwrite each other's files, and long-lived or leaked signed URLs in your code. Fix and undo for every finding. Never opens your files.
See it in action
Supabase RLS & Policy Audit
Example session with this skill installed
Audit the RLS on my Supabase project before we launch. Public schema only. Also check ./web for any service key that could end up in the browser. Don't change anything.
- Read your context and instructions
- Compiled the supabase rls
(Excerpt. Fictional demo data.)
Before I start: this audit only reads Postgres system catalogs, inside a read-only transaction. I won't open your .env files or print any key, and I won't change anything. If you want a fix applied, we'll do it one item at a time, with the undo shown first.
Ran the audit through psql (connection string from SUPABASE_DB_URL, which you set) and scanned ./web for key names.
| Severity | Count |
|---|---|
| CRITICAL | 3 |
| HIGH | 4 |
| MEDIUM | 5 |
| LOW | 3 |
Top findings
- CRITICAL E01: web/.env.local line 3 defines NEXT_PUBLIC_SUPABASE_SERVICE_ROLE_KEY. Anything with that prefix is built into the browser bundle, and the service role skips RLS. Rotate the key in the dashboard, then rename the variable and use it only on the server.
- CRITICAL R01: public.notes has RLS off, and anon can SELECT, INSERT, UPDATE and DELETE. Proposed fix: enable RLS and add an owner policy on user_id (SQL and undo in the report).
- CRITICAL S02: a storage policy lets anon upload to any bucket.
- HIGH R03: "logged in users can update orders" only checks auth.uid() is not null. Any signed-in user, including an anonymous sign-in, can change every order. Proposed fix: compare auth.uid() to the owner column.
- HIGH R07: view public.profile_summary runs as its owner, so it ignores RLS on profiles. Fix: alter view ... set (security_invoker = true).
Clean: profiles, jobs, tenant_data (FORCE RLS on), profile_summary_v2.
Not covered: the bodies of your SECURITY DEFINER functions, Edge Functions, and whether each policy matches your business rules.
Want to start with item 1? I'll show the steps, what breaks, and how to check it worked before anything changes.
How to use
- 1
Connect your agent to the Agensi MCP
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- 2
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- 3
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